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1 Introduction 
1.1 Fair and equitable treatment  
Most investment protection treaties include a provision on fair and equitable treatment1. 
The provision is included to ensure an investor from one of the contracting states a 
minimum level of treatment in the territory of the other, unrelated to the treatment of 
national investors2. The fair and equitable treatment standard is intrinsically connected 
to the international minimum standard (hereinafter “minimum standard”) in customary 
international law (hereinafter; “customary law”3). 
 
In most countries fairness and equity are considered to be fundamental values of the 
legal system. A provision like fair and equitable treatment, with the aim to safeguard a 
foreign investor against subjective arbitrariness and the authorities’ misuse of power, 
might seem superfluous in this setting. However, the standard is presumed to reflect a 
common international level of treatment which the Parties to a treaty accept as a matter 
of positive law4.  
 
The provision has proven difficult to interpret, and case law on the matter has been 
substantial during the last five years5. The fair and equitable treatment standard 
illustrate a political, ethical and legal problem inherent in investment protection treaties; 
the balancing the foreign investor’s interests with the sovereign right of the host state to 
regulate and govern in its own territory. The wider interpretation of the standard, the 
more the sovereign power and legislative will of the states are limited.  
 
There are principally three interconnected themes of discussion in relation to the 
provision; what level of treatment is guaranteed by the fair and equitable treatment 
standard? What is its relationship to the minimum standard of treatment under 
 
1 In a study of 335 bilateral investment treaties from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, only 28 did not 
expressly include the standard. See Khalil, referred in Vasciannie (2000) p. 126. A provision on 
“equitable” treatment was included  in a treaty for the first time in the 1948 US-Italy FCN 
2 See, however, item 5.2 where this starting point is somewhat nuanced.  
3 Except in item 4.1.2 
4 Vasciannie (2000) p.101 
5 One of the first arbitration on the provision was in 2000 (art. 1105 of NAFTA). In 2004 the standard 
was mentioned in 14 of 17 disputes (arbitration on jurisdiction and merits), reported by Investment Treaty 
Arbitration on http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
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customary law? And what impact does the development regarding the fair and equitable 
treatment standard have on customary law. 
 
There have been various attempts to codify the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Some of these attempts have remained drafts, others are non-binding documents and 
some have become multilateral treaties6. It will lead to far to present the attempts here, 
but a survey by OECD7 is enclosed in Annex I. 
 
1.2 Main elements in investment treaties 
To illustrate the “framework” in which the fair and equitable treatment standard is most 
often set, I will shortly present the main elements commonly included in an investment 
protection treaty. 
 
The scope of application is normally much more comprehensive than the ordinary 
meaning of “investment” would entail, and the phrase is traditionally defined in very 
wide-ranging terms8. The treaty normally defines “investors” as nationals and 
companies, and states are in principle free to choose the criteria of nationality9.  
Under most treaties there is an obligation to promote investments of the other Party’s 
investors; however, admission of foreign investment is ultimately a matter for each state 
to decide upon and regulate in the exercise of its sovereignty, and the treaties do 
normally not deal with questions of establishment10.  
 
The treaties normally contain provisions on transfers and expropriation11. The 
limitations on expropriation (public purpose and in accordance with law), and the right 
to compensation, have traditionally been considered a part of the minimum standard 
customary law. There is however a substantial discussion as to how far this right goes. 
The expropriation clause is usually quite comprehensive, including measures 
 
6 Schreuer (2005) p. 357 with further references 
7 OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 pp. 3-5 
8 “every kind of asset”, adding a broad, non-exhaustive list of what this might include 
9 Whether the investor or the investment is the object of the fair and equitable treatment standard depend 
the language of the specific treaty, see e.g. Siemens para 91-92 and Plama para 190 
10 Shihata p. 1372, Vasciannie p. 112 and Abs-Shawcross p. 119. An exception is the US treaties, which 
usually include pre-establishment provisions 
11 The provision on expropriation is probably, together with the non-discrimination issue and the dispute 
settlement provision, the subject that is most contentious, but also the most important element in a BIT 
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“tantamount” to expropriation, and giving guidance to “prompt, adequate and effective” 
compensation12.  
 
A key article in the treaties is the investor-state disputes settlement provision, which 
gives the investor the possibility to pursue his claims directly towards the host state, and 
contains an unconditional prior consent to arbitration from the contracting states13. 
There are usually also provisions on state-state dispute settlement. 
 
The treaties also include general treatment-articles. They are commonly grouped into 
two categories; the non-contingent; fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security, and the contingent, like the article on national treatment and the article on 
most favoured national treatment14. Fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security are usually included in the same provision, and there is an inherent connection 
between the two15. They have both been considered as part of customary law16. 
 
Most of the provisions, like expropriation, have specific conditions on compensation set 
out in the article itself, or a clear relationship to the often included “compensation for 
loss” article. The fair and equitable treatment standard does not refer to specific 
compensation standards, and the appropriate measure of compensation has been 
discussed by several tribunals17.  
 
An issue that has frequently been discussed in relation to investment disputes is which 
acts or omissions that can be attributed to the host state. I will not go further into this 
discussion in the present paper, but will use the term “state” concerning all entities 
which actions will be attributed to the state18. 
 
 
12 “The Hull Formula”, see e.g. Dolzer & Stevens (1995) p. 97 
13 E.g.Maffezini para 94 “dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of 
foreign investors” 
14 See, however, item 5.6 
15 E.g. OEPC para 187 and AAPL dissenting opinion 
16 E.g. AMT para 6.06 and CAFTA art. 10.5,2(b) 
17 E.g.. CMS para 409 (the Tribunal chose the “discounted cash flow method” in assessing the damage). 
The assessment of the pecuniary compensation should, if no other indication has been given, apply the 
general principles of state responsibility, see e.g. Brownlie (2003) chapter 21, item 11 and 12 (e.g. 
referring the Chorzow Factory (Indemnity) case (1928); “…payment of a sum corresponding to the value 
which a restitution in kind would bear”) 
18 See item 1.5.1 
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1.3 The fair and equitable treatment and breach of another treaty provision 
Which consequences a breach of another treaty provision has on the fair and equitable 
treatment provision has been analysed by several tribunals and commentators. Mann 
argued that the fair and equitable treatment standard has an overarching character, thus 
the “provisions of the Agreements affording substantive protection are not more than 
examples of specific instances of this overriding duty”19. This might be considered as 
an overgeneralisation20, but there have been several instances in which the Tribunals 
have found that the breach of another provision entails a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. In AMT21 the tribunal shows a pragmatic approach to this issue, by 
stating that it has reached its result on the process of the “two-fold reasoning based on 
the double legal foundation”. Judge Assante, in his dissenting opinion in AAPL22 
illustrated a different approach in finding that the treatment article had to yield to the 
special provision of Article “… which specifically governs the particular facts before 
the Tribunal”23. In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) this has been 
clarified by the Free Trade Commission (FTC) interpretation24, stating that "a breach of 
Article 1105 (1) is not established by a breach of another provision of NAFTA”25. 
Breach of another treaty provision will however be an element in the consideration of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard, e.g. discriminatory measures that also 
constitute breach of the national treatment provision26. I will not go further into this 
discussion here.  
 
1.4 Sources  
There is no global, horizontal instrument on foreign direct investments. However, a 
substantial number of bilateral, regional and sector specific treaties have been 
 
19 Mann (1981) p 243. Cited in e.g. Myers para 265 
20 See Myers para 266 
21 Para 6.14 
22 p. 369 
23 Generalia specialibus non deregant (special rules prevail and exhaust all the possible grounds of 
liability) 
24 See annex III and item 4.5 
25 This clarification is also made in the 2004 US Model BIT 
26 See item 5.2.1 
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adopted27. This has led to fragmentation and a diversity of languages, which 
complicates the matter of finding one single standard28. I have used the 1996 
Norwegian Model BIT as a point of departure for the interpretation of the language.  
 
The judicial decisions analysed in this thesis are based on NAFTA, and various bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). They are all based on investor-state dispute settlement 
procedures; i.e. between an investor of one of the contracting parties and another 
contracting party (host state). The decisions are all of recent date29.  
 
Customary law has an important role in establishing the content of the standard. I have 
based some of this thesis on literature from the last century, seeking to clarify the 
content of the minimum standard of treatment in international law. These theories 
substantiate the foundation of a customary law, and are thus relevant. Hence, what 
might be considered as outdated theories are actually the fundament upon which the 
treatment standard of foreigners today is based. Being a legal standard it is however 
constantly developing, and the level of treatment it entails today may be very different 
from the level it reflected decades ago30. In finding the present content of the standard I 
have used an OECD document as a central source31. Recent articles on the issue have 
also been of assistance.  
 
1.5 Related issues  
1.5.1 State Responsibility 
The work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the law of State Responsibility 
was previously focused on the substantive rules on the treatment of foreigners, and 
much of the early work of the ILC can be relevant when analysing the minimum 
standard, and hence the fair and equitable standard. However, the ILC now focus more 
 
27 2,200 bilateral investment treaties, 200 regional cooperation arrangement, and some 500 multilateral 
conventions and instruments, World Bank Report (2005) p. 175 
28 See chapter 4  
29 One of the first rulings to apply the standard of fair and equitable treatment under a treaty governing 
investment matters was the award of 30 August 2000 by an ICSID tribunal in the arbitration between the 
Metalclad Corporation (US based) and the United Mexican States, under chapter 11 of the NAFTA. 
30 See e.g. item 5.1  
31 OECD is currently seeking to clarify the meaning of various standards of the investment treaties, e.g. 
the fair and equitable treatment, see OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
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on “secondary rules”32, whereas I will concentrate my analysis on the “primary rules”33 
concerning the fair and equitable treatment standard. Hence the recent work of the ILC 
will not be discussed in this thesis. 
 
1.5.2 Human Rights 
The fair and equitable treatment standard has several common features to the 
International Human Rights, both procedural34 and material35. There have been 
attempts to synthesize the concept of human rights and the principles governing the 
treatment of aliens, by giving both nationals and aliens the same international standard, 
ensuring “fundamental human rights”36. Human Rights and the fair and equitable 
treatment standard have an overlapping content and ideology, but the instruments are 
not the same and the tribunals have different jurisdiction, which might lead to a gap in 
the interpretation of even the standards that seem to be the same. This is, however, a 
complex issue, which it will lead too far to examine here.  
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis  
The fair and equitable treatment standard is closely connected to the minimum standard 
of treatment in customary law. I will therefore begin by presenting the development of 
the minimum standard and look closer into the relationship between the standards. I will 
then seek to find the normative content of the fair and equitable treatment standard by 
treaty interpretation37, evaluate whether it is a unified standard and present its core 
elements, as they have crystallised through arbitration. Towards the end of the thesis I 
will consider the implications these clarifications may have on the development of 
minimum standard in customary law. 
 
32“the conditions on which a breach of a primary rule may be held to have occurred and the legal 
consequences of this breach”, cf. Cassese (2001) p. 185 
33 “substantive obligations”, ibid 
34 The individual’s right of dispute resolution against a state 
35 Due process etc. See Akehurst’s  (1997) p. 261; “indeed, the whole human rights movement may be 
seen as an attempt to extend the international minimum standard from the aliens to nationals, even though 
the detailed rules in declarations and conventions on human rights sometimes differ considerably from 
those in the traditional minimum international standard.”  
36 Brownlie p. 504, referring to Garcia Amador, special rapporteur of the ILC second report, Draft chapter 
on “violation of fundamental human rights”, art.1, Yrbk. ILC (1957), ii. 112. See also Harris p. 569 
37 based on the language of the 1996 Norwegian Model BIT  
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2 The International Minimum Standard of Treatment 
The Minimum standard was introduced by western capital-exporting countries during 
the 19th Century, when the improvement of communication methods led to enormous 
emigration and shifting of population, and international investments were extending 
over “the entire surface of the earth” followed by citizens from the investing 
countries38. Being treated as a national of the host country would not suffice to protect 
their interests “in countries whose methods of administering justice are very greatly at 
variance with the methods to which the people of the great body of civilized states are 
accustomed”39. The most powerful nations during this period saw the minimum 
standard as customary law, which can be illustrated by the Foreign Secretary Lord 
Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons in 185040: 
 
“We shall be told perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are 
liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers dance upon them; if 
they are liable to have their heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be 
swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be 
better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practiced 
upon them. We may be told this, but it that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of 
any reasonable man.” 
 
The minimum standard of treatment was seen as the floor below which treatment of 
investors could not fall, and should provide a basic and general standard detached from 
the Host State’s domestic law41. It ensured the rule of law, as understood in Western 
countries, regarding the protection of the life, liberty, dignity, and property of foreign 
nationals. In Hopkins42 the US-Mexican Claims Commission noted that: 
 
“… it not infrequently happens that under the rules of international law applied to controversies 
of an international aspect a nation is required to accord to aliens broader and more liberal 
treatment than it accords to its own citizens under its municipal law… The citizens of a nation 
 
38 Root (1910) p. 518 
39 Ibid, p. 521 
40 regarding the Don Pacifico case, ibid  p. 522  and Harris (2004) p. 569 
41 Dolzer and Stevens (1995) p. 58 
42 The United States of America on behalf of George W. Hopkins, Claimant  v. the United Mexican 
States, cited in Myers para 260. The Commission was established in 1924 to consider claims from US 
nationals that had suffered injuries during a decade of revolutionary activity in Mexico. It was given the 
jurisdiction to decide claims submitted to it in accordance with the principles on international law, justice 
and equity, see e.g. Thomas (2002) pp. 30-31. 
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may enjoy many rights which are withheld from aliens, and, conversely, under international law, 
aliens may enjoy rights and remedies which the nation does not accord to its own citizens.” 
 
This notion was, however, not universally shared. The Latin American countries 
opposed the view and argued that a state’s only duty was to treat foreigners in the same 
way as it treated its own nationals (national treatment standard)43. It was nevertheless 
seen as customary law and acted upon by the most powerful capital-exporting states 
from the 19th Century onwards44 .   
 
During the fifties and sixties, however, the establishment of new states and the global 
development towards self-determination and de-colonisation, in combination with an 
international super-power based on communism, led to some insecurity regarding the 
minimum standard45. The capital-exporting countries still required respect for a certain 
minimum standard46, but the voice of the capital-importing countries grew stronger in 
the international community, and they argued that permanent sovereignty gave the host 
country full control of foreign investments. 
 
The Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) was adopted in the UN General Assembly in 197447. Many 
industrialised states argued that the Resolutions were incompatible and highly damaging 
to the standards of protection of foreign investment established in customary law, e.g. 
by its statement;  
 
“… each state is entitled to exercise effective control over [its natural resources] and their 
exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalisation or 
transfer of ownership to its nationals …” 
 
 
43 Akehurst (2004) p. 260. Under the Calvo Doctrine, argued by the Argentine jurist C. Calvo (1824-
1906) as a reaction to the interventions of Western capital-exporting countries, see Cassese (2001) pp. 28-
29. “A “Calvo clause” is a clause in a contract between a state and an alien whereby the latter agrees to 
resort  to local remedies and not invoke the protection of the state of which it is a national”, see Harris 
(2004) p. 650  
44 Thomas (2002) p. 38 
45 Ibid p. 38 and Abs-Shawcross (1960) p. 119  
46 “It is a well established principle of international law that a State is bound to respect and protect the 
property of nationals of other States … Three basic principles flow from this ruled; fair and equitable 
treatment, the most constant protection and security, rights relating to property by an alien shall not be 
impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures”, see 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property p. 119  
47 G.A. Res. 3201 and 3202 (S. VI) adopted 1 May 1974. See also Denza and Brooks (1987) p. 909 
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Later the same year the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted48, 
which tilted the balance somewhat towards the industrialised states. But the language of 
some of the provisions was still highly controversial (e.g. the regulation of 
expropriation and nationalisation). The US, UK and most of the European Community 
states voted against the Charter, and most of the other capital-exporting countries 
abstained. 
 
The erosion of the standards of treatment of foreign investor and uncertainty of the level 
of treatment in international law, which followed from the adoption of the NIEO and the 
political situation in general during this period, made foreign investors hesitant to invest 
capital in developing countries. Against this background some Western countries 
developed their first Model Investment Protection Treaties, and the developing 
countries granted specific protection to investment through BITs to attract capital49. 
 
There is still some opposition to the existence of a minimum standard, at least in 
literature50. However, the number of treaties concluded worldwide containing a fair and 
equitable treatment provision - which occasionally even make specific reference to the 
minimum standard51 - illustrates a widespread and quite coherent state practice. These 
treaties have also been entered into by Latin-American, East-European and developing 
countries. As will be illustrated later in this thesis, the states seem to feel that they are 
legally obliged to follow a minimum standard of treatment in relations to foreign 
investors in their territory52. The question is thus; what is the content of the treatment 
standard in customary law?  
 
The traditional view among the Western nations was that a foreigner was entitled to be 
treated as a citizen of the host country, but that the level of treatment could not go below 
a certain threshold53;  
 
 
48 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) adopted 12 December 1974  
49 E.g. van Houtte (2002) p. 256 
50 E.g. Vasciannie (2000) p. 139 
51 E.g. US-Chile FTA art.10.4
52 Evidenced by transmittal statements etc., see chapter 3. See also e.g. Akehurst’s (1997) p. 260; “The 
majority of states accept that the national state can claim if the foreign country’s laws or behaviour falls 
below the minimum international standard.” 
53 Root (1910) p. 521 
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“The rule of obligation is perfectly distinct and settled. Each country is bound to give the 
nationals of another country in its territory the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, 
the same protection, and the same redress for injury which it gives to its own citizens, and 
neither more nor less: provided the protection which the country gives to its own citizens 
conforms to the established standard of civilization [emphasis added]” 
 
The normative content of the “established standard of civilization”54 is not quite clear, 
but some guidance can be found in case law from the early 20th Century55. Among the 
often cited cases is the Neer claim where the General Claims Commission set up by the 
United States and Mexico expressed the law as follows56: 
 
… the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards… the 
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so 
far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily 
recognize its insufficiency.” [Emphasis added] 
 
Whether this still is the test of customary law regarding the level of treatment of 
investors and their investment, and of the fair and equitable treatment standard, remains 
the most important question. In order to untangle this complex issue I will commence 
with the question that has been central to the tribunals in finding the correct level of 
treatment in the fair and equitable treatment standard; what is the relationship between 
the minimum standard and the fair and equitable treatment  standard? 
 
54 Another language of the standard is  ”a moral standard for civilized states”, see Brownlie (2003) p. 502 
55 Neer claim (1926), United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) iv. 60. Further 
reference is made to Roberts claim (1926) RIAA iv. 41; the Hopkins claim (1926), RIAA iv. 411 and 
British claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco (1925), RIAA ii. 617 at 644, all cited in Brownlie (2003) p. 
503 
56 In the Neer claim the US claimed that Mexico had failed to exercise due diligence in finding and 
prosecuting the murderer of a US national. The Commission unanimously rejected the claim, but 
indicated the standard it would have to apply 
  11 
 
3 The relationship between the fair and equitable treatment standard 
and the International Minimum Standard 
There are basically three alternative interpretations of the relationship between the 
international minimums standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard in 
international investment treaties. Some argue that they are referring to the same level of 
treatment57. This view could have two implications; fair and equitable treatment equals 
the Neer standard or it equals a more contemporary and evolved minimum standard. A 
second approach is to see the fair and equitable treatment standard as an autonomous 
standard, disconnected from the minimum standard. The standard will thus be 
established by treaty interpretation; i.e. the “plain meaning approach”58. The third way 
is to see the minimum standard as the foundation, upon which the fair and equitable 
treatment standard is built, as additional requirements.  
 
I find it plausible that the two standards refer to the same level of treatment. This 
understanding is however based on two assumptions; that the foundation is an evolved 
minimum standard59, and that it allows for nuances, reflecting the language of the 
specific treaty applied in each case60. In this chapter I will present the various 
approaches and explore the practical implications of the conclusion.  
 
When the fair and equitable treatment standard was introduced in the 1963 OECD Draft 
it was clearly stated in the Commentary that the level of treatment required conformed 
“in effect to the “minimum standard” which forms part of customary law”61. This 
appears to have been the settled meaning of the term until 1982 when it was argued by 
Mann62, in an article that has been often cited and sometimes criticised,  that it is the 
                                                 
57 E.g. CAFTA, annex III; fair and equitable treatment is seen as a part of the international minimum 
standard 
58 E.g. Vasciannie (2000) p. 103 
59 See chapter 5 and 7 
60 See chapter 4  
61 OECD Draft Convention (1963) p. 244 see also Abs-Shawcross draft (1960) p. 119   
62 Mann (1981) p. 241 
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express terms of the treaty that must govern and that it is misleading to equate the fair 
and equitable with the minimum standard; 
 
“this is because “the terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’ envisage conduct which goes far 
beyond the minimum standard and afford protection to a greater extent and according to a much 
more objective standard than any previously employed form of words. A tribunal would not be 
concerned with a minimum, maximum or average standard. It will have to decide whether in all 
circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable.  No standard 
defined by other words is likely to be material. The terms are to be understood and applied 
independently and autonomously”. 
 
Mann admitted that his conception of fair and equitable treatment was not universally 
shared63. However, his views acquired support in academic writings; see e.g. Dolzer 
and Stevens64 and UNCTAD65 where it is argued that most investment instruments do 
not make an explicit link between the standards, which they could do “if they believed 
the standards to be interchangeable”. The view has also found support in case law; see 
e.g. Tecmed66 where the Tribunal states that the scope of fair and equitable treatment “is 
that resulting from an autonomous interpretation, taking into account the text of … the 
Agreement according to its ordinary meaning …”. 
 
The position that the “fair and equitable treatment standard” is not limited to the 
minimum standard as contained in the international customary law, but takes into 
account the full range of international law sources, including general principles and 
modern treaties and other conventional obligations seem to find most support in recent 
sources.  This view was expressed in the 1984 OECD study67, where all Member 
countries which commented on this point, agreed that “fair and equitable treatment 
introduced a substantive legal standard referring to general principles of international 
law even if this is not explicitly stated”. Two NAFTA Tribunals (Metalclad and Myers) 
have also based their arbitration on that approach68.  
 
 
63 Thomas (2002) p. 52 
64 Dolzer and Stevens (1995) p. 60 
65 UNCTAD (1999), as cited in OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 p. 24 
66 Para 155: “conflicts with what a reasonable and unbiased observer would consider fair and equitable”. 
However, the Tribunal goes on to judge the claim against “international law and the good faith principle”, 
para 166. See also OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3. A comprehensive discussion on the standard can 
be found in Pope&Talbot where the Tribunal used the fairness element rather than the standard in the 
traditional minimum standard, see paras 105-118  
67 See “Intergovernmental Agreements Relating to Investment in Developing Countries” OECD, 1984, 
referred to in OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 p. 19 
68 Ibid   
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This view, however, can arguably be seen as being on collision course with the opinion 
given by several states in relations to implementation and usage of articles on fair and 
equitable treatment; namely that the provision provides for a minimum standard of 
treatment, based on long-standing principles of customary law, see e.g. Swiss Foreign 
Office Statement from 197969 and Canada’s implementation statements regarding 
NAFTA70. If the fair and equitable treatment standard is inherently seen as synonymous 
to the minimum standard, there is arguably no reason to make an explicit link in the 
treaty text. This seems to be the starting point in the 1963 OECD Draft Convention, 
which is the model for most investment treaties around the world71. 
 
In AAPL Judge Assante, in his dissenting opinion, considered the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment, and primarily by reference to the commentary on the OECD Draft 
Convention, stressed that the fair and equitable standard conformed to the minimum 
standard72.  
 
Several writers have opposed the view originally presented by Mann, and find that the 
fair and equitable treatment is synonymous with the minimum standard, with statements 
like “the incorporation of customary law principles obligating the host government to 
accord fair and equitable treatment …”73 and “This is a reflection of the basic standard 
of treatment that enlightened international practice in countries owe to their alien 
guests.”74  Even Mann seems to modify his views on the fair and equitable treatment as 
an autonomous standard in an article published a year after the above mentioned one, 
where he noted that75  
 
“In some cases, it is true, treaties merely repeat, perhaps in slightly different language, what in 
essence is a duty imposed by customary international law; the foremost example is the familiar 
 
69 cited by Mann (1981) p. 244 
70 “… this article provides for a minimum absolute standard of treatment, based on long-standing 
principles of customary international law …”. (Supported by the US and Mexico, see submissions to 
Pope&Talbot Tribunal and Metalclad judicial review accordingly), see Thomas (2002) p. 57. See also e.g. 
US implementation of US-Armenia BIT, where the provision is described as incorporating customary law 
principles when presented to the senate for approval, ibid p. 50 
71 See p. 11, above 
72 See OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 p. 13 
73 Price, cited in Thomas (2002) p. 56. See also Gann p. 389 and Fatouros (1962) cited in OECD 
.DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
74 Walker (1957) pp. 822-823. Has been cited e.g. by Gann, Thomas and Vasciannie 
75 Mann, “The Legal Aspects of Money” (1982) p. 510, as quoted by Thomas (2002) p. 58. However, the 
first article was reprinted in his book “Further studies in international law” in 1990 without any 
alterations 
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provision whereby states undertake to accord fair and equitable treatment to each other’s 
nationals and which in law is unlikely to amount to more than a confirmation of the obligation to 
act in good faith, or to refrain from abuse or arbitrariness”.  
 
It seems impossible to establish a certain and universal answer to the relationship 
between the fair and equitable treatment standard and the minimum standard, based on 
the contradictory opinions presented above. As indicated76, I find the best view to be 
that they are reflecting the same standard, as this seems to be what most states originally 
intended77. However, the answer might not have much practical effect; it is not clear 
whether, or to what extent, the relationship has consequences on the level of treatment 
entailed by a fair and equitable treatment provision when applied in a specific case.  
 
The NAFTA FTC delivered its note of interpretation of regarding the minimum 
standard of treatment78 subsequent to the Tribunal’s Second Award in the Pope & 
Talbot case79.  The Tribunal then examined the compatibility of its Second Award with 
the FTC’s interpretation and conceded that “it might appear” that its own interpretation 
was different from the one adopted by the Commission80.  The tribunal concluded that 
this was not necessarily the case and that the question of the consistency of these two 
interpretations would depend on “whether the concept behind the fairness elements 
under customary law [was] different from those elements under ordinary standards 
applied in NAFTA countries”81.  The Tribunal decided to verify the validity of its 
finding contained in its Second Award by using the threshold standard of “egregious” 
unfair conduct that Canada had asserted should apply under Article 1105.  It concluded 
that even applying this “restrictive interpretation” to the facts of the case, would lead to 
the exact same conclusions it reached in its previous Award.  
 
In the CMS the Tribunal was reluctant to conclude on the relationship between the 
minimum standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard and stated that82
  
 
76 See p. 11, above 
77 Cf. the 1963 OECD Draft Convention and several transmittal documents and comments as presented 
above 
78 See Annex II and item 4.5 
79 Award on Merits, 10 April 2001 
80 Award on Damages, 31 May 2002. In the second award the Tribunal concluded that the fair and 
equitable treatment standard went beyond the international minimum standard 
81 Ibid para 56, see OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
82 Para 294  
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“While the choice between requiring a higher treaty standard and that of equating it with the 
international minimum standard might have relevance in the context of some disputes, the 
Tribunal is not persuaded that it is relevant in this case. In fact, the Treaty standard of fair and 
equitable treatment and its connection with the required stability and predictability of the 
business environment, founded on solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different 
from the international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.” 
 
The Tribunal referred to Pope & Talbot83 and argued that “in spite the fact that the 
Tribunal opted for a NAFTA standard additional to or higher than that of customary law 
it still based its test on equity, justice and reasonableness”. 
 
The arbitral tribunals seem, in their interpretation of the “fair and equitable standard”, 
increasingly to go beyond the specific discussion on the relationship to the minimum 
standard as defined by customary law, and rather focus on identifying the elements 
encompassed in the fair and equitable treatment standard, based on treaty interpretation 
and application of the standard by other tribunals.  The core elements include elements 
of the Neer standard84. On this background it appears to be at least a significant link and 
overlap between the standards, and the practical consequences might be found to be the 
same regardless of the “status” of the standard85. It can thus be argued that the 
relationship between the minimum standard and the fair and equitable treatment 
standard becomes gradually less important, as this new standard emerges. 
 
83 Para 271  
84 However, the standards have been somewhat more elaborated through case law, and the threshold has 
arguably evolved. The foreign investor’s legitimate expectations are likely to be on a higher level than in 
1926 when e.g. Neer was arbitrated, see chapter 5 
85 The conclusion might, however, have a significance in relations to what the impact of case law etc. on 
the fair and equitable treatment provision have on the minimum standard. I will revert to this in chapter 6 
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4 ”Fair and equitable treatment” as treaty standard 
The investor’s claim to a certain level of treatment under the fair and equitable 
treatment provision is based on interpretation of the specific treaty. Under this item I 
will illustrate how specific factors in the treaty and its formation can be of guidance in 
establishing that level of treatment.  
 
4.1 The ordinary meaning of the terms 
4.1.1 “Fair and equitable”, “reasonable and equitable” and “equitable” 
A typical fair and equitable treatment provision is found in the 1996 Norwegian Model 
BIT86: 
 
“TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS 
 
1. Each Contracting Party will accord in its territory for the investments made by investors of the 
other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment.” 
 
The words “fair” and “equitable” are not defined in the Model BIT itself, and hence the 
ordinary meaning of the terms has to be established87. “Fair” and “equitable” implies a 
proper balancing of conflicting interests in an even-handed, just and legitimate 
manner88. 
 
The language of the provision in the Norwegian treaties89 varies, and in the most of the 
treaties the phrasing “fair and equitable treatment” is replaced by a provision employing 
the synonyms “reasonable and equitable treatment”90. In an internal document from the 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade, the change is described as “mainly a rewriting of the 
 
86 Norway has not negotiated BITs since 1996. The Model BIT is currently being revised, and the present 
Model BIT would not be introduced as a Norwegian proposal if the negotiations were to be resumed. 
87 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31 
88 For a similar starting point, see MTD para 113 
89 See annex II 
90 China (-84), Poland (-90), The Czech Republic (-91), Slovakia (-91), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (all 
-92) 
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provision … with a certain difference in nuance”91. One could argue that the Norwegian 
translations of fair and equitable (“rettferdig og rimelig”) and reasonable and equitable 
(“rett og rimelig”) have the same meaning in Norwegian, which indicates that the 
variation of language does not imply a variation of the standard. The negotiations are 
performed in English, and at the time of the Norwegian negotiations (the 1980s and 
1990s) there were no judicial decision and scarce literature on the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. The application of the synonyms might thus be unintentional 
deviation.  
 
This is not a problem related only to the Norwegian treaties. The formulation and 
location of the fair and equitable standard varies among the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral instruments, and it varies through time (same state, various languages92) 
and geography (various languages from the different states).  
 
Vandevelde suggests that the term “fair and equitable treatment” as used by the US is 
the equivalent of the “equitable treatment” set out in various FCN treaties93.  On the 
other hand it has been reported that some countries, in relation to the United Nations 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporation, argued that “fair and equitable” would 
introduce the minimum standard while “equitable” would not94 . 
 
In my view, a provision using synonyms cannot be found to have a different content 
than an article including “fair and equitable”, unless this conclusion is supported by the 
context or other means of treaty interpretation.  
 
The language gives an idea of the standard; to treat the foreign investor in an unbiased 
and proper manner, but it does not do much for clarifying the level of treatment entailed 
in the provision.  
 
 
 
91 Informal translation 
92 E.g. the 1994 US Model BIT compared to the 2004 US Model BIT, see www.naftalaw.org. 
Furthermore the result of the negotiations can obviously vary  (comp. US Model BIT to e.g. BIT with 
Panama) 
93 Vandevelde (1988) p. 221 
94 UNCTAD (1999) p. 31 
  18 
                                                
4.1.2 Reference to “international law” or “customary international law” 
In the treatment article in the Norwegian Model BIT no reference is made, either to 
“international law” or to “customary international law”. According to the 1984 OECD 
study95, however, the fair and equitable treatment standard is contained in clauses which 
specifically refer to international law in a considerable number of treaties. 
 
Some argue that a provision with no reference to “customary international law” (or 
“international law”) cannot, under the principles of the Vienna Convention, be 
interpreted to denote the minimum standard96; it must be presumed that the parties 
would have included such reference if their intention was to apply a standard already 
part of customary international law. It may, however, be argued that the term itself 
includes a reference to the existent standard97. The 1963 OECD Draft made no such 
reference, but it is clear that it indicated the international law standard. Furthermore, it 
was concluded in the 1984 OECD study that a reference to international law should be 
implied even if such reference was not made98. Hence it seems a very categorical 
approach to find that no reference in the text implies that the minimum standard is not 
part of the treaty standard. 
 
There is a variation in language regarding customary international law, which may have 
implications on the interpretation; in some treaties fair and equitable treatment should 
be “… no less than required by international law”99 in others the phrasing is “… 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment”100. This can imply that the first standard give guidance to a higher level of 
treatment than the latter. However, this is rather vague, and one should find support in 
other sources than the mere language to establish that it is really the case. 
 
There seem to be an overlapping use of the terms “international law” and “customary 
international law” in the treaties. However, based on the listing in Article 38 of the 
 
95 See footnote 67 
96 This seems to be the approach made by the Tribunal in the MTD, see para 110 following. However, the 
Tribunal used the standard of TecMed para 154 (see chapter 5).  See also Schreuer (2005) p. 360. 
97 See chapter 3  
98 Ibid  
99 Emphasis added. See e.g. 1987 US Model BIT, Swiss BITs etc, referred in Pope&Talbot para 111 
100 Emphasis added. See e.g. NAFTA 
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Statutes of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)101 customary international law is only 
one of the components of international law, and hence has more limited scope. The 
variation in languages may have implications on the possibility of applying other 
sources of law, like other treaties between one of the Contracting Parties and third states 
and the general principles of law102, in order to establish the content of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. In the 1984 OECD Study it seems clear that the member 
states meant to include all sources of international law103. Regarding NAFTA, this 
insecurity is resolved by the interpretation of the FTC, see item 4.5. 
 
 
4.2 Context, object and purpose 
An important purpose of investment treaties is the “promotion and reciprocal protection 
of investments” and the desire e.g. “to encourage and create favourable conditions for 
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party on the basis of equality and mutual benefit”104.  Hence, fair and 
equitable treatment should, as a starting-point, be understood as treatment contributing 
to encourage the promotion and protection of foreign investment105. 
 
The ambiguity of the language may lead to a situation where the object and purpose of 
the treaty play an important role. However, some caution might be advised when trying 
to interpret the fair and equitable treatment standard based solely on this foundation. Sir 
Ian Sinclair106 argued that there is a risk; 
 
“…that the placing of undue emphasis on the “object and purpose” of the treaty will encourage 
teleological methods of interpretation [which] in some of its more extreme forms, will even deny 
the relevance of the intention of the parties” 
 
One cannot for example presume that the parties’ intention was to give general priority 
to the promotion and protection of investments over its sovereign powers.  
 
 
101 Generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of international law, see Brownlie p. 5 
102 UNCTAD p. 12 
103 See chapter 3  
104 Title and preamble of the 1996 Norwegian Model BIT 
105 See MTD para. 113 for a similar interpretation (relating to NAFTA) 
106 “The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, (1984), 2nd edition at p. 130 as cited in the Plama 
case para 193 
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4.3 Supplementary means of interpretation 
Documents that may possibly be relevant as supplementary means of interpretation107 
include negotiating texts, minutes of meetings and other documents that can shed light 
on the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion. However, these kinds of documents are 
often non-existent. In the Methanex case108, the US arguments against releasing the 
documents requested by the claimants were that they  
 
“were questionable due to their fragmentary nature, resulting from the absence of any verbatim 
transcript or agreed minute of the NAFTA parties’ negotiations, combined with the speed at 
which the negotiations of NAFTA took place” 
 
The situation for documents relating to bilateral treaties, of presumably less importance 
and with less negotiating resources than the NAFTA, is likely to be worse.  
 
Implementing documents and preparatory work of one party may shed some light on the 
parties’ intention, but one must show caution; a one-sided account of the treaty does not 
necessarily denote a “meeting of the minds” between the Parties on a specific item109. 
Furthermore, the implementing documents are not always very clear regarding the 
specific content of a provision, see e.g. the Norwegian implementation of the BIT with 
China, which was enacted by the Parliament; the provision is only referred to as an 
obligation to give the investments a fair and equitable treatment110. 
 
If the Parties have agreed on a particular interpretation, e.g. NAFTA FTC111, this should 
be taken into account, together with the context, cf. Article 31(3)(a). 
 
4.4 Inter-temporal dimension 
When interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard it could be a question of 
whether the relevant standard is “fair and equitable” as it was regarded at the time that 
the treaty was concluded or at the time of the dispute. If one should emphasis the will of 
the Parties the first approach might seem logical. However, fair and equitable treatment 
is a standard and should as such reflect the evolution of the law and its principles 
 
107 Cf. Vienna Convention article 32 
108 Part II Chapter H para 11   
109 It might however be used as an argument by an investor against a host state, showing that party’s 
intent 
110 Ot.prp. nr. 42 (1984-85) p. 2 
111 See item 4.5 
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outside the treaty112. In Mondev it was concluded that it was customary law at the time 
when the treaty entered into force that was relevant when interpreting the standard. This 
seems a rather odd solution which would imply that a treaty entered into in 1926 would 
have adopted the Neer level of treatment and should be assessed from that starting 
point. This would not seem to be coherent with the treaty’s object and purpose to 
contribute to a good investment climate. Furthermore, the legal situation will be 
complex and unpredictable if one has to establish the level of treatment accepted in 
international law at any given time in recent history. It might even arguably give 
investors better protection under customary international law than under the specific 
treaty113 and it would certainly give investors protected under more recent treaties better 
protection, even though the language of the provision is the same114. It does seem 
unlikely that the parties would intend such a result. 
 
If parties want to “freeze” the treatment standard to a certain level, they should state this 
in the specific provision. 
 
 
4.5 NAFTA – The interpretation by the FTC 
In 2001 the NAFTA FTC issued an interpretation inter alia on the relationship between 
article 1105(1) and the minimum standard in customary law115. According to the FTC 
the provision does not go further that the minimum standard. NAFTA arbitral tribunals 
are bound by the interpretation made by the FTC116. The interpretation has been 
discussed by a number of tribunals, and it has been argued that the interpretation is an 
amendment of the standard, rather than an interpretation117.  I will not go into this 
discussion, but will simply conclude that after the FTC interpretation it is clear that in 
 
112 E.g. statement by the ICJ in Danube para 140; “current standards must be taken into consideration” 
113 This right would however not be directly enforceable by the investor, because customary law is not, as 
a starting point, included in the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction 
114 It would probably be possible to apply the MFN article, but I will not go into that discussion here 
115 See Annex III 
116 NAFTA Article 1131(2) 
117 The interpretation was issued during a number of pending cases, in which all the claimants argued that 
that the FTC interpretation was specifically targeted against them (see US observation referred in 
Methanex part IV, C, para 18). Sir Robert Jennings’ second opinion, a legal opinion for Methanex, has 
frequently been cited in support of it being an amendment. 
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relation to NAFTA “fair and equitable treatment” is not a freestanding obligation. It 
constitutes obligations only to the extent that they are recognized by customary law118. 
 
The consequences the interpretation will have on tribunals in relation to cases based on 
other treaties are not clear. It has no direct bearing on other treaties, but the NAFTA 
cases have been the main source of clarification of the standard thus far, and a narrow 
understanding of the NAFTA provision may lead to a more limited standard in general. 
This will however be a matter of consideration in each specific case.  
 
A result of the interpretation is that it is now clear that the standard employed by the 
NAFTA tribunals is that the decisions under the treaty are intended to clarify and mirror 
an evolution of customary law, see chapter 6119. 
 
118See e.g. Loewen para 128. The term “international law” is thus interpreted to mean “customary 
international law” 
119 In Mondev para 122 it was stated that only the evolution up to 1994 was included, see also item 4.4  
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5 Core Elements  
5.1 Is it a unified standard?  
The point of departure is that fair and equitable treatment is a treaty standard which 
must be interpreted according to its language, context, object and purpose120. However, 
if one can establish that the fair and equitable treatment standard has become a norm 
with some core elements included, variances in the text of each specific treaty may have 
less importance.  
 
In this chapter I will seek to identify core elements, or sub-categories, of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, by analysing some of the arbitration and literature that has 
been produced on the issue over the last five years. It may be too early to say that they 
are of universal application, and the first issue to discuss is whether it even is a unified 
standard121. The development is likely to continue, as this provision increasingly is 
being claimed by investors. Hence the discussion below represents stocktaking of the 
development at this stage122.  
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard does not have an exact meaning, and the 
provision still seems rather open-ended. It has been argued that the exact meaning can 
only be defined when the standard is applied in a specific situation, balancing the 
various interests involved to a set of specific facts123.  This seems to be a common 
understanding among commentators and arbitral tribunals. In Mondev124 the Tribunal 
argued that “What is fair and equitable cannot be reached in abstract; it must depend on 
 
120 See chapter 4 
121 The elements will be presented regardless of what is found to be the connection to the minimum 
standard. I will discuss  which implications the establishment of core elements under the fair and 
equitable treatment standard has on the customary law standard in chapter 6 
122 See also Schreuer (2005) 
123 See e.g. U.N. Conference On Trade & Development, referred in OECD DAFFE/IME/(2003)4/REV3  
124 Para 118 
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the facts of the particular case”. This open approach has been seen as a problem by 
some jurists125. 
 
The language can even primae facie seem to imply that the test is simply whether the 
investment has been treated fairly and equitably126, inviting an ex aequo et bono 
consideration.  However, although fair and equitable might be considered as indicative 
of the extralegal concepts of fairness and equity, it should not be confused with the 
concept of ex aequo et bono127. In Mondev128 the Tribunal underscored the point that  
 
“Article 1105(1) did not give a NAFTA tribunal an unfettered discretion to decide for itself, on a 
subjective basis, what was “fair” or “equitable” in the circumstances of each particular case ... It 
may not simply adopt its own idiosyncratic standard of what is “fair” or “equitable”, without 
reference to established sources of law.” [emphasis added] 
 
In UNCTAD129 it is argued that even the “plain meaning approach” is not devoid of 
content, because a third party is called upon to apply an objective standard and guidance 
may be derived from international law in general. The Tribunals have to find an 
equitable solution within the framework of applicable law, applying the principle equity 
infra legum130.  
 
But even though it seems certain that the test is more than a discretionary consideration 
by the Tribunals, it might not seem feasible to reduce the nebulous image of the words 
“fair and equitable treatment” to any concrete, objective terms. The fair and equitable 
standard shall safeguard a level of treatment to investors through shifting times, in 
relations to heterogeneous societies, in a variance of social, technological and political 
organisations, and the standard hence needs a certain flexibility and elasticity. This is an 
inherent characteristic of a legal standard131; its scope and normative message are less 
defined than in than in more specific rules. 
 
 
125 E.g. Fatouros, cited in OECD DAFFE/IME/(2003)4/REV3 
126 See chapter 4. This approach can be found in Pope & Talbot and is supported by Mann (1981) 
127 See Schreuer (2005) p. 365 
128 Para 119, See also ADF para 184, see also ibid 
129 UNCTAD (1999) p. 11 
130 “… that form of equity which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of 
its attributes”, ICJ Mali vs Burkina Faso (1986) para 28, as referred in Thomas (2002) p. 17. See also 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969 p.47 para 85:  “It is not a matter of finding simply 
an equitable solution, but an equitable solution derived from the applicable law” 
131 ”Introduction to the Philosophy of Law”, Pound (1922), cited in Knoph (1939) p. 4 
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Judge Higgins argues that "fair and equitable treatment" are “legal terms of art well 
known in the field of overseas investment protection” and that they have a well-known 
meaning132. This might be an overstatement, but the standard is definitely in the process 
of getting a clearer content. 
 
Arbitration on the fair and equitable treatment standard has proliferated in the five years 
that have elapsed since Metalclad. The awards have primarily been issued relating to 
NAFTA, and it is not clear to what extent the NAFTA and BITs tribunals feel bound by 
the case law. They do, however, in most cases apply the precedents as a starting-point, 
or as an element of their deliberations. On this basis one can detect signs of an emerging 
legal norm, giving reference to explicit criteria and limitations within which each case 
should be considered, beyond the mere consideration of whether an investor has been 
treated fairly and equitably in a specific case. 
 
The statements on the content of the standard are not quite concurrent, but the basic 
notion of what infringements the investor is protected against seem to correspond. Judge 
Schwebel defined “fair and equitable treatment” as “a broad and widely-accepted 
standard encompassing such fundamental standards as good faith, due process, 
nondiscrimination, and proportionality”133. In Myers134 it is stated that “Article 1105 
imports into the NAFTA the international law requirements of due process, economic 
rights, obligations of good faith and natural justice.” In UNCTAD135 it is argued that 
one can extrapolate state action that may be inconsistent with fair and equitable 
treatment by identifying certain forms of behaviour that appear to be contrary to fairness 
and equity in most legal systems, such as if “a state acts fraudulently or in bad faith, or 
capriciously and wilfully discriminates against a foreign investor, or deprives an 
investor of acquired rights that leads to the unjust enrichment of the state …”  
 
A more recent account of elements that are being deduced from the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in case law is found in Waste Management (2004), in a passage that 
has been frequently cited by later tribunals136:  
 
132 Judge Higgins, Oil Platforms case para 39  
133 MTD para 109, referring to the Opinion of Judge Schwebel para 23 
134 Para 134 
135 UNCTAD (1999) p. 12. See also Schreuer (2005) p. 365 
136 Waste Management para. 98. Repeted in e.g. Gami para 89 
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“… despite certain differences of emphasis a general standard for Article 1105 is emerging. 
Taken together, the S.D. Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen cases suggest that the minimum 
standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the 
State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or 
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or 
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might 
be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of 
transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant 
that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably 
relied on by the claimant.” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Some states have also endeavoured to define the content of the standard, by making the 
provision on fair and equitable treatment in their investment treaties more precise and 
exhaustive. An example can be found in the Draft Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), which was recently approved by the U.S. House of 
Representatives137. In the same way as other recent investment instruments in which 
USA is a party, the formulation of the provision on the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is very careful and narrow. The only element included in the listing is the 
principle of due process138. 
 
There have also been some attempts in recent literature to specify the core elements of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard. The OECD analyse the elements in five 
categories139; (a) Obligation of vigilance and protection, b) Due process including non-
denial of justice and lack of arbitrariness, c) Transparency, d) Good faith – which could 
include transparency and lack of arbitrariness and e) Autonomous fairness elements.140
Schreuer has a less categorical approach; he summaries the standards the various 
Tribunals have employed in their efforts to define a general standard141; The high 
threshold formulated in Neer142, The ICJ’s standard in ELSI143, “improper and 
discreditable”, discrimination, reference to international or comparative standards, “a 
 
137 28 July 2005. The Agreement was approved by a narrow majority; 217 to 215, cf. “International Law 
in Brief”, 29 July 2005. For the language of CAFTA, see Annex IV 
138 See also US-Chile FTA  
139 The Tribunals, in the first four of these categories examined in the OECD survey, defined “fair and 
equitable” in accordance with international law, while one Tribunal adopted an autonomous definition, 
see OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
140 The elements presented by Choudhury (2005) are a) Transparency, b) Due process (Including i. Denial 
of a right to a fair hearing, ii. Administrative decisions without an evidentiary basis and iii. Discreditable 
legal outcome ), c) Breach of legitimate expectations, d) Arbitrary and discriminatory conduct, e) Acting 
beyond the scope of legal authority and f) Good faith.  
141 Schreuer (2005) p.373 
142 referring to “an outrage, bad faith and to wilful neglect of duty” 
143 “a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial 
propriety” 
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failure to effectively implement aspects of domestic law is not necessarily a breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard” and other criteria, such as arbitrariness, 
idiosyncracy, injustice, lack of good faith, lack of due process and proportionality. 
 
This illustrates that there seem to be emerging elements, but that they can be 
categorized in several ways. The reasoning and weighing of the various elements are 
vague and to a substantial degree overlapping. Transparency can for example be seen as 
a condition by its own right, as part of the legitimate expectations of the investor or 
subsumed under denial of justice144. 
 
I will start by presenting the elements that are relevant as the basis of the standard, or 
the areas of law that have hereto been included in the standard, focusing on three core 
standards that are also part of international customary law; Denial of justice, Due 
diligence and Good faith. The standards encompass several other elements such as 
discriminatory and arbitrary behaviour and transparency. I have chosen a more 
“overarching” approach because some of the “sub-categories” of the core elements have 
only been argued by one or two tribunals. My starting point is that the standard is 
interconnected to another legal standard; the legitimate expectations of the investor, 
based on international law and the particular prospects that the specific investor 
reasonably should be able to rely on. The legitimate expectations of the investor can be 
seen as a core element itself, but also as a threshold for the treatment.  
 
5.2 Denial of justice 
The alien’s right not to be subjected to “denial of justice” is considered an important 
principle of international customary law and constitutes a substantial part of the 
minimum standard145. Customary law imposes an obligation on states “to maintain and 
make available to aliens, a fair and effective system of justice”146. An article in Harvard 
Research Draft147 also illustrates the principle;  
                                                 
144 I have chosen the latter approach 
145 The terms “Procedural propriety” or “due process” can also be used in order to describe this principle, 
see Schreuer (2005) p. 381.  
146 Loewen para 129, referring to Respondent’s expert Professor Greenwood QC. See also Freeman (1938) 
p. 50 and 328. He argued that the central test was whether the judicial act or omission “infringes any 
international rule aiming, either wholly or in part, at the legal protection of foreigners.” He further argued 
that if a judgement is “in flagrant disregard of the aliens’ rights”, an international claim arises. This notion 
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“A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of justice. Denial of justice 
exists where there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross 
deficiencies in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those 
guaranties which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, 
or a manifestly unjust judgment. An error of a national court which does not produce manifest 
injustice is not denial of justice.” 
 
Denial of justice includes acts and omissions of all branches of the State’s government 
(executive, legislative and judiciary). It can be established both through procedural and 
material deficiencies.  
 
The principle has been adopted by arbitration panels in disputes relating to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. There are various elements that can be included in the 
concept of denial of justice. In Azinian148 the tribunal held that;  
 
“A denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they 
subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way… There is a 
fourth type of denial of justice, namely the clear and malicious misapplication of the law. This 
type of wrong doubtless overlaps with the notion of ‘pretence of form’ to mask a violation of 
international law.” [Emphasis added] 
 
In Mondev149  the Tribunal rejected a denial of justice claim and attempted to set 
threshold of the standard. The Tribunal stated that;   
 
“the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally accepted 
standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the facts that 
the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that the 
investment has been subjected to ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’.” [Emphasis added] 
 
There is a fine line between an erroneous judgement, and a judgement which constitutes 
a Denial of justice. Governments and judiciaries do make mistakes, but the ordinary 
remedy in these cases is not found by raising a denial of justice claim, but by “internal 
political and legal processes, including elections”150. As stated in the Harvard Research 
Draft, an error of a court is not necessarily a denial of justice. The arbitration panels are 
not courts of appeal to an investor that has lost on the merits after the exhaustion of 
 
was also advocated by de Visscher (as interpreted by Freeman, ibid p. 327) in his finding that judgement 
being rendered “manifestly contrary to all justice” no longer is regarded in international relations “comme 
une oeuvre de justice”. The international duty of protection is violated and appeal to international action 
is thus open. 
147 Article 9. See also Brownlie (2003) p. 506  
148 Para 103 
149 Para 127 cited in Loewen para 132 
150 Myers Para 261. This statement was endorsed and adopted by Gami, see para. 93, see OECD 
DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
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local remedies, even though there might arguably be inadequacies in the judgment. This 
has been underlined by tribunals, e.g. Myers151 “[the] Tribunal does not have an open-
ended mandate to second-guess government decision making” and Azinian152;  
 
 “The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, 
however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as though 
the international jurisdiction seised has plenary appellate jurisdiction. What must be shown is 
that the court decision itself constitutes a violation of the treaty. Even if the … courts were 
wrong … this would not per se be conclusive as to a violation of NAFTA. More is required; the 
Claimants must show either a denial of justice, or a pretence of form to achieve an 
internationally unlawful end.” [Emphasis added] 
 
 
In finding denial of justice both the result itself and the process leading up to it has to be 
analysed. In Loewen153 it is stated that “Manifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due 
process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety is enough…” 
The Tribunal concluded that “the whole trial and its resultant verdict were clearly 
improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum standards of 
international law and fair and equitable treatment.”  
 
The threshold of a denial of justice claim must be high. This can be illustrated by 
Professor Greenwood’s statement his Second Opinion in Loewen; 
 
 “the awards and texts make clear that error on the part of the national court is not enough, what 
is required is “manifest injustice” or “gross unfairness”, “flagrant and inexcusable violation” 
or “palpable violation” in which “bad faith not judicial error seems to be the heart of the 
matter” . “[t]he alien must sustain a heavy burden of proving that there was an undoubted 
mistake of substantive or procedural law operating to his prejudice”. [Emphasis added. 
Reference omitted] 
 
 
It has been made a point of the legitimacy of the entity that has made the decision in 
some denial of justice claims. As stated in the by the tribunal in the Mondev154; “It is 
one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary and another to second-
guess the reasoned decisions of the highest courts of a State.”  
 
 
 
151 Para 261 
152 Para 99 
153 Para 132 [Emphasis added.] The Tribunal concluded that “the whole trial and its resultant verdict were 
clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum standards of international law 
and fair and equitable treatment.  
154 Para 126  
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While a mere error of law is not enough to establish denial of justice, Brownlie argues 
that an error in law accompanied by a discriminatory intention may be a breach of the 
international standard155. This brings us to another element that has been considered by 
many tribunals under the fair and equitable treatment standard; discriminatory or 
arbitrary action.  
 
5.2.1 Discriminatory and Arbitrary 
Customary law does not require that a state treat all aliens (and alien property) equally, 
or that it treats aliens as favourably as nationals. Indeed, “even unjustifiable 
differentiation may not be actionable”156. 
 
The ordinary meaning of the words “fair and equitable” does, however, seem to imply 
that there is an element of non-discrimination in the standard157, i.e. that discriminatory 
treatment can constitute a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard on the 
merits. However, many treaties include a provision which specifically prohibits 
discriminatory or arbitrary actions as well as provisions on national treatment and most 
favoured nation treatment158. In Genin159 “fair and equal” and “non-discriminatory and 
non-arbitrary” treatment are discussed jointly, but the Tribunal states that the latter 
language “further requires the signatory governments not to impair investment by acting 
in an arbitrary or discriminatory way”.  
 
Several Tribunals seem to emphasise the discriminatory element. In Myers160 the 
Tribunal found that a breach of the national treatment provision could also establish a 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. In Lauder161 the Tribunal stated that 
the Media Council had not discriminated the investor in favour of a national, and hence 
 
155 Brownlie p. 507, footnote 54.  
156 See Dolzer and Stevens (1995) pp. 61–62. See also Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume 1 
“Peace” (9th edition), p. 933 noting that “[a] degree of differential treatment as between 
national and foreign investment may be called for, and is not necessarily contrary to the state’s 
international obligations”, cited in Genin para 368 
157 See Chapter 4 
158 The 1996 Norwegian Model BIT does not include such a provision, but an example can be found in 
the US-Estonia BIT; “Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of 
investments.”   
159 Paras 366 and 367 
160 Para 266. See also Choudhury (2005) p. 313  
161 Para 291 
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the investor had not demonstrated a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard162. In Gami163 it is stated that “Each NAFTA party must … accept liability if 
its officials … implement regulations in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion”164. The 
attitude presented by these tribunals does however seem to be rebutted by the tribunal of 
the recent Methanex165. The Tribunal, “ignoring … the FTC’s interpretation”, argues 
that “the plain and natural meaning of the text … does not support the contention that 
“the minimum standard of treatment” precludes governmental differentiation between 
nationals and aliens.” The tribunal goes on to argue that “even if Methanex had 
succeeded in establishing that it had suffered a discrimination for its claim under 
[national treatment] it would not be admissible for it, as a  matter of textual 
interpretation, to establish a claim under Article 1105” 166. The arguments of the 
Tribunal is based on the fact that there is a reference to discrimination elsewhere in the 
article (relating to losses suffered by armed conflict and strife), and it can thus be 
interpreted as if differentiations between nationals and aliens in other situations is 
deemed legally discriminatory167. The universal value of this statement might 
consequently be questioned, but at least it can be argued that the fair and equitable 
treatment article in treaties containing a separate provision on discrimination might have 
a more narrow scope than if no such provision is included.  
 
Some tribunals have applied the standard set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in ELSI168, relating to arbitrary conduct, in search for the fair and equitable treatment 
standard; see e.g. Mondev169
 
“In the ELSI case, a Chamber of the Court described as arbitrary conduct that which displays “a 
wilful disregard of due process of law, … which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial 
propriety”. It is true that the question there was whether certain administrative conduct was 
“arbitrary”, contrary to the provisions of an FCN treaty. Nonetheless … the Tribunal regards the 
Chamber’s criterion as useful also in the context of denial of justice, and it has been applied in 
that context …” [Emphasis added. Reference omitted] 
 
 
162 See Choudhury (2005) p. 314 
163 Para 94 
164 Regarding the NAFTA this interpretation can no longer be applied, see item 4.5 and annex III, but the 
FTC’s interpretation does not preclude it from being used as an argument regarding other treaties 
165 Part IV Chapter C Para 14 
166 Ibid para 16 
167 inclusio unius est exclusion alterius 
168 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ, 20 July 1989 
169 Para 127. See also Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Resubmitted Case, Award of 31 May 
1990 paras 136-137 
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In Azinian170 the Tribunal also seems to consider arbitrary conduct as a breach of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard in stating that  
 
“If the Claimant cannot convince the Arbitral Tribunal that the evidence for this finding was so 
insubstantial, or so bereft of a basis in law, that the judgments were in effect arbitrary or 
malicious, they simply cannot prevail.” 
 
 
It seems clear that arbitrary measures and judgements may constitute denial of justice 
and thus be contradictory to the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
 
  
5.2.2 Transparency  
Transparency is an essential element of a due process. The investors are reliant on 
transparency regarding the legal framework and processes concerning their investments. 
The principle has close connection to the legitimate expectations of the investor, in the 
sense that the investor has to be able to trust that he can access all relevant 
information171.   
An example of transparency being a vital element of the consideration of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard can be found in Metalclad. One of the issues of the case 
was that Metalclad’s application for a construction permit was denied without the 
company having had an opportunity to participate in the deliberation process. Metalclad 
was not notified of the Town Council meeting where the permit application was 
discussed and rejected nor given any opportunity to participate in that process.  
The Tribunal understood transparency172 to include; 
 
“the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and 
successfully operating investments made […] should be capable of being readily known to all 
affected investors of another Party. There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such 
matters. Once the authorities of the central government of any Party […] become aware of any 
scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this connection, it is their duty to ensure that the 
correct position is promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all 
appropriate expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in accordance with all relevant 
laws.” 
 
 
170 Para 105 
171 See item 5.5 
172 Para 76. Reference was made to NAFTA article 102(1) 
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Transparency has also been considered an important element of the standard by other 
tribunals, relating to the administrative and judicial process and regarding the legal 
framework, see e.g. Maffezini173  and TecMed174.  
 
Metalclad has subsequently been annulled by the Supreme Court of British Colombia, 
finding that transparency obligations were not included in Chapter 11. Transparency is a 
separate article of NAFTA, beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal175. This cannot, 
however, been taken to mean that it is precluded as being an element of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. A blatant reference to an article outside the scope of the 
Tribunals jurisdiction is one thing, another is seeing a transparent process and access to 
the legal framework as part of what the investor legitimately can expect176.  
 
5.3 Due diligence 
In a number of decisions177, the tribunals make reference to the obligation of the state to 
exercise due diligence178 in protecting foreign investment in order to find an act or 
omission of the State as being contrary to fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security179.   
 
UNCTAD has examined the meaning of this doctrine, and found that fair and equitable 
treatment is related to the traditional standard of due diligence and provides a 
“minimum international standard which forms part of customary international law”180. 
The obligation of due diligence in international customary law, can be illustrated by this 
statement by Verdross181;  
 
173 Regarding a loan transaction, para 83, see also Choudhury (2005) p. 304 
174 Para 154 
175 Choudhury (2005) p.303 
176 The two other decisions referred under this item are based on BITs and hence not influenced by the 
annulment. The decision in TecMed was even taken after the annulment procedure. 
177  See e.g. AAPL, AMT and  Wena Hotels Ltd.   
178 “‘Due diligence’; the care that a reasonable person exercises under the circumstances to avoid harm to 
other persons or their property”, Encyclopædia Britannica (2003). “‘Due diligence’; The legal obligation 
of states to exercise all reasonable effort to protect aliens and their property in the host state”, Oxford 
Dictionary of Law, fifth ed (2003). The requirement has also been phrased as an obligation of vigilance, 
see e.g. OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
179 In these cases, the standards of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” have 
been interlocking and examined together by tribunals, ibid p. 25.  
180 U.N. Conference On Trade & Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties In The Mid-1990s at 53, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7(1998)  
181 Alfred Verdross, translation by OECD, see OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 
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“In all its corrective measures, the State has to develop as in its preventive measures, the 
activities of a normal State.  It is therefore according to the principle of the international standard 
that we will have to evaluate whether the preventive measures or the responses … are or not 
sufficient from the point of view of international law ...According to the opinion of governments 
[in the Society of Nations on the occasion of the preparation for the Conference on the 
codification of international law] ‘the diligence to take into consideration is the one, one can 
expect from a civilized nation’.” 
 
Articles on due diligence was also incorporated in the Harvard Research Draft182, 
including the requirement of due diligence in relation to prevent injury (if local 
remedies have been exhausted without adequate redress).  
 
In a more recent decision (AAPL183), relating to protection under an investment 
protection treaty, Judge Asante, in his dissenting opinion, made the following comments 
on the meaning of fair and equitable treatment: 
 
“Article 2(2) prescribes the general standard for the protection of foreign investment.  The 
requirement as to fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security and non-
discriminatory treatment all underscore the general obligation of the host state to exercise due 
diligence in protecting foreign investment in its territories, an obligation that derives from 
customary international law. [Emphasis added] 
 
In AMT the Tribunal stated that the host state is under an “obligation of vigilance, in the 
sense that [it] shall take all measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of 
protection and security of its investments”184.  
 
In Wena Hotels ltd the Tribunal found that Egypt had violated its obligation of vigilance 
under the BIT “by failing to accord Wena’s investments fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security”185. The Tribunal found sufficient evidence that Egypt was 
aware of the EHC’s (State-owned Egyptian Hotels Company) intention to seize the 
hotels yet took no preventative action, did nothing to protect Wena’s investment after 
 
182 Articles 10-12. See also Borchard (1930) p. 518: “[t]he article predicating state responsibility upon 
lack of due diligence in preventing or punishing the acts of private individuals, one of the most well-
established rules of international law”, commanded a majority only of twenty-one to seventeen…” 
The Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law appointed by the Hague 
Conference in its meetings March-April 1930 in voting for a tentative and partial list of ten articles. See 
also British Claims in the Spanish Morocco (U.S.A (H. Roberts) v. United Mexican States), as cited in 
Thomas (2002) p. 34 
183 One of the main issues in the case was whether a government assurance of “full protection and 
security” in Article 2(2) of the Sri Lanka/United Kingdom Bilateral Investment Treaty (1980) created and 
obligation of strict liability for each State Party. Both the majority judgement and the dissent denied the 
strict liability approach. The relevant Article 2(2) was as follows: “Investments or nationals or companies 
of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment with full protection 
and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party”, cf. OECD DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3  
184 See also ibid 
185 See ibid pp. 26-27 
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the illegal seizures, made no attempts to return the hotels to Wena following the illegal 
seizures, refused to compensate Wena for its losses and failed to prosecute the EHC or 
its senior officials.  
 
These awards indicate that the obligation of due diligence has evolved to go beyond the 
mere prevention and protection against criminal and violent acts. It now seems to 
include a duty to prevent and protect the investor and/or the investment of the investor 
from any intervention that may be detrimental to such an extent that it over the 
threshold for what the investor can expect under international law186. 
 
5.4 Good faith 
Treatment of an alien amounting to “bad faith” was one of the elements that could 
establish breach of international law under the Neer standard187. This has been followed 
in more recent awards, e.g. Azinian188, where the Tribunal seems to consider malicious 
state action as sufficient evidence of a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. In Genin189 the tribunal found that the claimants had failed to prove “the 
intention to harm … or to treat them in a discriminatory way”, thus supporting the view 
that the intention of the state is a valid element in considering the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.  
 
In TecMed190 the Tribunal found that the commitment of fair and equitable treatment 
included in the Agreement was “an expression and part of the bona fide principle 
recognized in international law,
 
although bad faith from the State is not required for its 
violation: “To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the 
outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly 
and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.””191
 
 
186 See item 5.5 
187 See chapter 2 p. 10  
188 Para 103 and 105 
189 Para 369 (the statement is related to the provision on arbitrary and discriminatory treatment). The 
Tribunal refers to Brownlie (2003) p. 541, footnote 96 (“[t]he test of discrimination is the intention of the 
government”). The tribunal also stated that “Under the present circumstances - where ample grounds 
existed for the actions taken by the bank of Estonia – the Respondent can not be held to have violated [the 
fair and equitable treatment standard]” 
190 Para 153, including citation from Mondev Para 116  
191 [Emphasis added. References omitted] 
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In Loewen192 the Tribunal went even further in the direction of an objective requirement 
by stating that “Neither State practice, the decisions of international tribunals nor the 
opinion of commentators support the view that bad faith or malicious intention is an 
essential element of unfair and inequitable treatment …”193, and in OEPC194 the 
Tribunal made it clear that the fair and equitable treatment standard is indeed an 
“objective requirement that does not depend on whether the Respondent has proceeded 
in good faith or not”. 
 
Hence, subjective bad faith is not a prerequisite, but it may be a valid argument in 
favour of finding a breach of the standard195.  
 
5.5 The legitimate expectations of the investor  
The legitimate expectations of the investor can be seen as a starting-point when 
assessing the fair and equitable treatment standard. An illustration in case law applying 
some of the elements of the standard (good faith, transparency and arbitrary), and using 
the legitimate expectations of the investor as a point of reference for the level of  the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, can be found e.g. in TecMed196 where the Tribunal 
stated the following;   
 
“The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith 
principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to 
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken 
into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host 
State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations 
with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that 
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. […] 
The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily 
revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the 
investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business 
activities. The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions 
of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to such 
instruments […]” [Emphasis added] 
 
 
192 Para132 
193 In this case, however, Professor Greenwood stated in his Second Opinion that “bad faith … seems to 
be the heart of the matter”. 
194 Para 186 
195 See also Mann pp. 244-245 “bad faith need not to be proved by the investor” and CMS para 280; 
“… this is an objective requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent has had deliberate intention or 
bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such intention and bad faith can aggravate the 
situation but are not an essential element of the standard.” 
196 Para 154 
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This passage has been frequently cited in arbitral awards, e.g. in OEPC197 and CMS198. 
 
In finding what the investor legitimately can expect, reference is often made to the 
object of the treaty, see e.g. CMS199 where fair and equitable treatment was seen to be 
inseparable from the treaty’s object to maintain a stable framework for investments and 
maximum effective use of economic resources200 with the result that, although some 
changes were allowed, the “framework can [not] be dispensed with all together, when 
specific commitments to the contrary have been made. The law of foreign investment 
and its protection has been developed with the specific objective of avoiding such 
adverse legal effects.”201
 
This passage also illustrates that the investor can only rely on the legal framework at the 
time of the investment to a certain extent. In most cases it seems that it is the state’s 
specific commitments towards an investor that are relevant. In Waste management202 the 
Tribunal stated that “in applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in 
breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant.” The Tribunal found that it was clear that the City failed in a number of 
respects to fulfil its contractual obligations to Claimant under the Concession 
Agreement. However, the Tribunal concluded that a mere breach of contract (“even 
persistent non-payment”) is not sufficient to find a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. In MTD203 the location of the Project was deemed a fundamental 
assumption of the bargain between MTD and the State of Chile, the Tribunal has found 
that Chile had treated MTD unfairly and inequitably treatment by its authorisation of an 
investment that could not take place for reasons of its urban policy.  
 
It does not seem that the Tribunals have placed any significance to whether it is a 
contract or an administrative decision that has been breached, the central point seem to 
be that it is a representation by the state or by a unit which acts are attributed to the 
 
197 Para 185 
198 Para 268 (claimant) 
199 Paras 274-276 
200 Cf. the preamble of the treaty 
201 See also CME  where the Tribunal found that “The Media Council breached its obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment by evisceration of the arrangements in reliance upon with the foreign investor was 
induced to invest.” [emphasis added] 
202 Para 98 
203 Para 188  
  38 
                                                
state. It is still unclear to what extent the fair and equitable treatment standard will 
protect a foreigner against breaches of contract by governmental authorities204, and it 
will lead to far to go deeper into this problem here. 
 
A number of tribunals have also considered the state’s action in breach of their own 
municipal laws. In Gami205 the Tribunal stated that “… a government’s failure to 
implement and abide by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign investor 
may but will not necessarily lead to a violation of Article 1105.” The result of this 
deliberation will depend upon the context, e.g. to what extent the investor has depended 
on the implementation. In Loewen206 another factor is underlined; the special 
importance attached to discriminatory violations of municipal law in International 
law207.  
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard does of course not give the investor a right to 
fulfil all of his expectations208. In Maffezini209 the Tribunal stated that “Bilateral 
Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business judgements” and in 
MTD210 it was stated that “This conclusion … does not mean that Chile is responsible 
for the consequences of unwise business decisions or for the lack of diligence of the 
investor”. 
 
On all accounts the investor’s expectations have to be balanced with the host state’s 
need to have possibility and autonomy to develop its own policy. The measures in issue 
may have been taken by or on behalf of the Party concerned in the exercise its sovereign 
powers, which will have to carry weight in the determination211. In Myers212 the 
Tribunal underlined that the determination of whether or not there is a breach of the fair 
 
204 See Schreuer (2005) p. 386 
205 Para 91 
206 Para 135 
207 The Tribunal refers e.g. to Harvard Research Draft art 6 with Comments (see p. 174);(“the judgment is 
manifestly unjust, especially if it has been inspired by ill-will towards foreigners, as such, or as citizens of 
a particular states”). See also Freeman, p. 310;  A discrepancy between national and international law will 
be seen as denial of justice if the consequences of that conflict “evidences a derogation from the general 
duty of protection owed towards aliens under international law,…” 
208 See e.g. Gami para 85; “No one has suggested that NAFTA entitles an investor to act on the basis that 
a regulatory scheme constitutes a guarantee of economic success” 
209 Para 64. Repeted e.g. in CMS para 64 and MTD para 178 
210 Para 167 
211 1967 OECD Draft p. 121 
212 Para 263 
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and equitable treatment standard “must be made in the light of the high measure of 
deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to 
regulate matters within their own borders”.  
 
5.6 Is fair and equitable treatment really a non-contingent standard? 
The fair and equitable treatment standard has traditionally been presented as a non-
contingent standard, i.e. a “fixed point of reference”, “an absolute standard” or an 
“international level of treatment” 213, as opposed to the national treatment standard and 
the most favoured nation standard which are dependent on the treatment the host state 
give their own nationals or nationals from another country. It has been presented as the 
only instance in which a party is obligated to conform its treatment of investments to a 
standard that is determined by the collective behaviour of states, rather than by the 
actions of the party itself214. Brownlie, in comparing the minimum standard to the 
national treatment standard, argues that there is no single international treatment 
standard, and that where a reasonable care or due diligence standard is applicable 
diligentia quam in suis215 might be employed216 . 
 
It seems clear that an international standard is the starting point for arbitrators and 
commentators when considering the fair and equitable treatment standard, see e.g. 
Mondev217 where it is indicated that the standard (the denial of justice element) may be 
compared to the rule stated in the Harvard Research Draft Article; “unreasonably 
departs from the principles of justice recognized by the principal legal systems of the 
world”. In Myers218 the Tribunal finds that an investor has been treated in such an 
unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment raises to the level that it is “unacceptable 
from the international perspective”. This is also evident in Genin219;  
 
 
213 See e.g. Vasciannie (2000) pp. 105-106, UNCTAD (1999) p. 12,  Walker (1957-58) p. 811 and 
Schreuer (2005) p. 367 
214 Bergman (1983) pp. 19 - 20 
215 “i.e national treatment, but on the basis of the standard ordinarily observed by the particular state in its 
own affairs.”, see Brownlie (2003) p. 504 in foot note 35 
216 ibid p. 503; “[t]he core principle, which is simply that the territorial sovereign can not in all 
circumstances avoid responsibility by pleading that nationals and aliens had received equal treatment.” 
217 Para 127 
218 Para 263 
219 Para 367 
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“...Under international law, this requirement is generally understood to ‘provide a basic and 
general standard which is detached from the host State’s domestic law’. While the exact content 
of the standard is not clear, the Tribunal understands it to require an ‘international minimum 
standard that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a minimum standard” 
 
Hence the question is; is it really a fixed standard, regardless of national indicators? 
The international minimums standard was built on western values, which might have 
been some of the problem with its acceptance220.  It seems hard to establish a common 
rule of law that entails all the different values and social preferences of the various parts 
of the global society, and it has also been argued that the standard is less universal than 
it seems, see e.g. Ocran221; “the minimum would be higher in a highly developed 
European country than in a sparsely inhabited and only partially developed territory in 
[say] Africa or Asia.” The arguments used in Higgins222 in favour of a “relativism 
approach” to the due diligence standard can also be applied in relation to the minimum 
standard or fair and equitable treatment standard. Furthermore, although the idea is a 
unified standard, the expectations of the investor is linked to the level of treatment that 
follows from laws, regulations and policies of the specific state which indicates that the 
“floor” of the standard might vary. However, the core idea; the elements entailed and 
the fact that the investor’s expectations are valid point of reference may be considered 
to entail a unified concept or norm based on international law. 
 
220 Akehurst’s (1997) p. 261. Brownlie (2003) p. 503. see also the 1957 ILC report where a member of the 
commission saw it as “a standard of a particular economic and social system was held out as the 
universally just standard”, ibid p. 505. Brownlie goes on to argue that it is not possible to put forward a 
minimum standard “which in effect supports a particular philosophy of economic life at the expense of 
the host state”. See also Petrobart  where the tribunal refers to the “rule of law in a democratic society”. 
221 T. M. Ocran “Bilateral investment protection treaties: a comparative study” in Fatouros (1994) p. 121, 
citing Beckett, 17 Grotius Society Transactions 175, 179 (1931)  
222 Higgins (1994) p. 156 
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6 Do the developments of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
represent an evolution of the international minimum standard? 
It has been argued that the core elements as represented above constitute a “working 
definition” for the fair and equitable treatment standard223. Under this item I will 
discuss whether the core elements of the fair and equitable standard, as presented above, 
also can be said to represent a contemporary understanding of the minimum standard in 
customary law224. 
 
Customary law is inherently evolutionary. State practice and opinio juris changes, and 
reflect general development. The famous Neer standard arguably falls short of the 
notion of a minimum level of treatment as it will be interpreted today, and the NAFTA 
Parties have explicitly agreed that the minimum standard “is not frozen in amber at the 
time of the Neer decision”225 and that it “has evolved and can evolve”226. However, 
they underline that “the threshold for finding violation of the minimum standard of 
treatment is still high”227. 
 
If states, arbitrators and commentators consider and apply fair and equitable treatment 
as an autonomous standard, unrelated to the minimum standard, the arbitration on the 
matter would arguably not have the same effect on customary law as if it is seen and 
applied as synonymous to (or an element included in) the minimum standard228. The 
relationship is still being debated and there are examples of arbitration on the basis of an 
 
223 Choudhury (2005) pp. 316-317 
224 It can be argued that the fair and equitable treatment standard has become customary law in its own 
rights, given the substantial number of treaties in which the standard is included. However, this is a 
complex issue, states have different opinions of what the standard entails and the solution will arguably 
not lead us closer to establishing the correct level of treatment, hence I will not discuss this issue further 
here.  The issue has been discussed in e.g. Pope&Talbot and Mondev. See also Loewenfeld (2002) pp. 
486-488 
225 ADF para 179 
226 Mondev para 124, see also para 108 
227 ADF para 179 
228 See chapter 3 
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autonomous standard229. Most of the arbitral awards are, however, based on a notion 
that fair and equitable treatment and the minimum standard are closely connected230, 
which makes it easier to argue that the elements crystallised in connection with the fair 
and equitable treatment standard have a bearing on the minimum standard. However, 
the crux of the matter is state practice and opinio juris. If states do not conform to the 
elements and the level of treatment they entail in a consistent manner, or if they do not 
feel that they are under a legal obligation to so, the elements cannot be said to represent 
the standard. 
 
The number of treaties that include a fair and equitable treatment provision makes a 
good case for seeing the “fairness element” in the treatment of the investment as part of 
customary law231. Furthermore; the elements presented above are well grounded in 
customary law, and should thus not be contentious. However, it seems that, at least 
some states are of the opinion that the principle of fair and equitable treatment has been 
interpreted too widely, in the sense that the threshold for finding breach of the standard 
has been set too low. Annulment procedures in NAFTA, statements from states 
involved in dispute settlements, the interpretative note from the NAFTA FTC and more 
recent treaties with a tendency to specify the content of the standard in a more narrow, 
exhaustive way232 are all arguments indicating that the states are quite reluctant to 
accept all the level of treatment indicated above as the minimum standard. It is, 
however, still early; the elements are related to arbitral awards during the last five years 
and in another five years this question may very well be easier to answer.  
 
229 See e.g. Pope&Talbot  
230 A substantial part of the arbitration is based on NAFTA (after 2001), in which the standards are 
considered coherent  
231 See, however, foot note 224 
232 Especially by the NAFTA Parties. See also CAFTA, annex IV, which defines Fair and equitable 
treatment and only includes due process/denial of justice. 
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7 Final remarks 
There are indications that most states had not foreseen the extensive interpretation of 
fair and equitable treatment standard when entering into investment treaties with such 
articles. The obvious illustrations of this are listed under chapter 7; annulment 
procedures, NAFTA FTC, more specific treaties etc 233. Another example are the 
Norwegian BITs; the article on fair and equitable treatment is hardly mentioned, neither 
in the preparatory work nor in the transmittal documents. Furthermore, most BITs have 
been incorporated by royal decree and not by acts of Parliament, which would be 
applied for treaties with significant implications234. A reason for this may be that the 
states saw the provision as coherent with the minimum standard, hence reflecting the 
level of treatment set in the landmark cases in the end of the 19th Century235. This is not 
a very stringent standard, and most states would feel that they are in no risk of acting in 
contradiction with the principle. Furthermore, although the provision has been included 
in treaties for five decades, all the arbitration is of recent nature. This indicates that not 
much emphasis has been placed on the provision until now. 
 
But the development during the last five years shows that the provision has a “hidden 
depth”. In some arbitrations measures that could not be subsumed under specific 
provisions (e.g. expropriation) still has been found to be in breach of the treaty 
obligation by application of the fair and equitable treatment standard236. This way, the 
careful formulation of the specific provision may be worthless. This was probably not 
the intention of the parties. 
 
The standard is open-ended and placed at the discretion of the various tribunals. This 
leads to a complex and ambiguous legal situation. It is not clear what emphasis future 
 
233 However, a substantial number of treaties with the traditional language of the fair and equitable 
treatment provision are still concluded. 
234 The Norwegian Constitution § 26, 2. There are other articles in the treaty which should also indicate 
that the treaties should have been incorporated by act of Parliament 
235 See e.g. Roberts case; the test is, broadly speaking, whether aliens are treated in accordance with 
ordinary standards of civilization”. See also Thomas (2002) p. 36 
236 See e.g. Pope&Talbot 
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Tribunals will place on the previous arbitral awards and other sources attempting to 
clarify the standard. Arbitration can lead to extensive and even contradictory results237.  
Given this situation it might be wise for states to specify the content of the provision. 
The US has done so in its last Model BIT. However; to embellish a specific treaty 
provision that should safeguard the investors from infringements from the host state in 
detailed and inflexible rules seems impossible and futile. As a legal standard some 
uncertainty is inevitable if it is to be sufficiently flexible, hence the level of protection 
and the infringement of sovereignty will be in the hands of the arbitrator. The level of 
trust toward the arbitrator is of significant importance in this situation. The threshold 
value should be high, aware of what interests the standard is balanced against. 
 
One could argue that the attitude towards investment treaties in general is different than 
it was in the 90ies. Extensive arbitration (substantial number of cases, wide in scope and 
high damages) and a more realistic reciprocity have made at least some states more 
cautious and less liberal when it comes to investment treaties. The problems related to 
the limitation on sovereignty have become more evident among the developed states 
during the last five years. Treaties on investment protection are no longer fitting the 
image of western capital-exporting states wanting to secure the investments of their 
nationals in developing countries. Great transformation of economies in Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia and indeed many developing countries has transformed former capital-
importing countries to capital-exporters238. Furthermore a substantial part of the more 
recent treaties on investment protection, like the NAFTA and other Free Trade 
Agreements including investment provisions, are between developed countries.  
 
There are issues of interests that I have not found room to analyse in the framework of 
this thesis; e.g. what is the value of a fair and equitable treatment provision in treaties 
without prior consent to investor-state dispute settlement239? What happens if the 
standard is used in an agreement limited to the promotion element and not measures on 
investment protection? What about areas that are carved out from the scope of the 
Treaty, e.g. tax or sectoral measures? Could an investor claim unfair and inequitable tax 
 
237 e.g. Lauder, which seems to be based on the same facts as the CME case, but arrived at the opposite 
result. See also Choudhury (2005) 
238 See Shihata (1993) p. 1369 
239 See e.g. EFTA-Tunisia FTA. See also UNCTAD (1999) p. 12 and item 5.1, above 
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measures? And there are many, many more questions of interest regarding this 
subject… 
 
It is too early to establish a clear definition for the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
and it is arguably too early to flesh out the content of the minimum standard in 
customary law. It is not even possible to come to a universal conclusion regarding the 
relationship between the two standards. What seems evident, however, is that the 
content of the fair and equitable treatment standard, and other issues regarding the 
standard, will develop and get clearer through case-by-case arbitration. It may be argued 
that there now is a tendency towards a more stringent interpretation240. Maybe the 
“heydays” of the standard are coming to an end? Qui vivra verra… 
 
240 After NAFTA FTC etc 
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  ANNEX I 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD 
 
 Copied from DAFFE/IME(2003)4/REV3 pp. 3-5 
 
The first reference to “equitable” treatment is found in the 1948 Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organisation. Its Article 11(2) contemplated that foreign investments should 
be assured “just and equitable treatment”. The Article provided that the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) could:  
1. make recommendations for and promote bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
measures designed… 
2. to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and 
technology brought from one Member country to another. 
The organisation was to be authorised, inter alia, to promote arrangements which would facilitate 
“an equitable distribution” of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment, with due regard to 
the needs of all member States. Also, the member States were to recognise the right of each State to 
determine the terms of admission of foreign investors on its territory, to give effect to “just terms” 
on ownership of investment, and to apply “other reasonable requirements” with respect to existing 
and future investments.241 Because of a number of unresolved issues, some major developed 
countries did not ratify the Charter, bringing the first post-war multilateral effort on trade and 
investment to an unsuccessful conclusion.  
At the regional level, in 1948, the Ninth International Conference of American States adopted the 
Economic Agreement of Bogotá,242 an agreement covering among other things, the provision of 
adequate safeguards for foreign investors. Article 22 of the agreement included the following 
language: 
“Foreign capital shall receive equitable treatment. The States therefore agree not to 
take unjustified, unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair the legally 
acquired rights or interests of nationals of other countries in the enterprises, capital, 
skills, arts or technology they have supplied”.243  
                                                 
241. Although this provision is valuable as precedent, it did not itself guarantee this standard of treatment 
for investors; it merely authorised the International Trade Organisation to recommend that this standard be 
included in future agreements. 
242. See Stephen Vasciannie in “The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law and Practice” in the British Yearbook of International Law, (2000), vol. 70, pp. 99-164. 
243. In addition, it provided that Parties would not set up “unreasonable or unjustified impediments that 
would prevent other States from obtaining on equitable terms the capital, skills, and technology needed for 
their economic development”. 
 A
 Like the Havana Charter, the Bogotá Agreement failed to come into force due to lack of support. 
At the bilateral level, the US treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN), developed 
after the First World War, contained a standard reference to international law in connection with 
protection of the persons and property of aliens. In the period following the preparation of the 
Havana Charter, the terms “equitable” and “fair and equitable treatment” started to appear in certain 
of the US FCN treaties244. The proponents of the standard considered it as a safeguard against state 
action that violated internationally acceptable norms.245
In 1959, the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, developed under the leadership of Herman 
Abs, the Director-General of the Deutsche Bank and Lord Shawcross, the UK Attorney General, in 
its Article 1 stipulated that “each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
property of the nationals of the other Parties”.246 This effort led to the German proposal to the 
OECD that it develop a convention on the international protection of private property.  
Intensive discussions started in the OECD in the early 60’s and culminated in the adoption of the 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property by the OECD Council on 12 October 
1967. Under the Article 1 (a) “Treatment of Foreign Property: “Each Party shall at all times ensure 
fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of the other Parties…”. The Draft 
Convention, although never opened for signature, represented the collective view and dominant 
trend of OECD countries on investment issues and influenced the pattern of deliberations on 
foreign investment in that period. The requirement to “ensure fair and equitable treatment” in the 
Draft Convention placed greater emphasis on the standard than earlier instruments.  
                                                 
244. US FCN treaties with Ireland (1950), Greece (1954), Israel (1954), France (1960), Pakistan (1961), 
Belgium (1963) and Luxembourg (1963), contained the express assurance that foreign persons, properties, 
enterprises and other interests would receive “equitable treatment” while others including those with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Ethiopia and the Netherlands used the terms “fair and equitable treatment” for 
a similar set of items involved in the foreign investment process. K. Vandevelde suggests that the term “fair 
and equitable treatment” as used by the US is the equivalent of the “equitable treatment” set out in various 
FCN treaties; see Vandevelde “The Bilateral Treaty Program of the United States”, Cornell International Law 
Journal, 21 (1988) pp. 201-76. 
245. J.C. Thomas “Reflection on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence of 
Commentators”, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal (2002) 17 (1) pp.21-101. 
246. Abs and Shawcross, “The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table: 
Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors”, Journal of Public Law, 9 (1960), pp. 119-24. 
 A
 ANNEX II 
 
NORWEGIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
 
 
 Date of signature Entry into force Pub.  details247  
Madagascar248 13 May 1966 8 September 1967 1967 p. 374
China 21 November 1984 10 July 1985  1986 p. 446
Sri Lanka 13 June 1985 13 June 1985 1986 p. 452
Poland  5 June 1990 24 October 1990 1990 p. 726
Hungary 8 April 1991 4 December 1992 1992 p. 1362
The Czech Republic 21 May 1991 6 August 1992 1992 p. 554
The Slovak 
Republic249
21 May 1991 6 August 1992 1992 p. 554
Romania 11 June 1991 23 March 1992 1992 p. 344
Estonia 15 June 1992 15 June 1992 1992 p. 624
Latvia 16 June 1992 1 December 1992 1992 p. 1512
Lithuania 16 June 1992 19 December 1992 1992 p. 1374
Chile 1 June 1993 8 September 1994 1994 p. 1328
Peru 10 March 1995 5 May 1995 1995 p. 458
Russia 4 October 1995 21 May 1998 1998 p. 416
 
                                                 
247 Norsk traktatsamling 
248 The treaty with Madagascar is a on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN), but includes investment 
provisions  
249 See protocol between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Slovak 
Republic on the agreements governing bilateral Slovak-Norwegian relations, 16 September 1994 
 A
 ANNEX III 
 
NAFTA 
Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment 
http://www-tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/nafta.html 
 
1.   Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security. 
 
2.   Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article 1108 (8) (b), each Party 
shall accord to investors of another Party, and to investments of investors of another Party, 
non-discriminatory treatment with respect to measures it maintains or adopts relating to 
losses suffered by investments in its territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife. 
 
3.   Paragraph 2 shall not apply to existing measures related to subsidies or grants that are 
inconsistent with Article 1102. 
 
 
 
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
 (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 2001) 
(excerpt) 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp
 
 
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law  
 
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
investments of investors of another Party. 
  
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do 
not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.  
 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach 
of Article 1105(1).  
 A
 ANNEX IV 
 
Draft Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
http://ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/asset_upload_file328_4718.pdf
 
Article 10.5: Minimum Standard of Treatment250
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
 
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to 
covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by 
that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 
to provide: 
 
(a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, 
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due 
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; and 
 
(b) “full protection and security” requires each Party to provide the level of police 
protection required under customary international law. 
 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or 
of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article. 
 
Annex 10-B 
Customary International Law 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that “customary international law” 
generally and as specifically referenced in Articles 10.5, 10.6, and Annex 10-C results from 
a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. 
With regard to Article 10.5, the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law principles that protect the 
economic rights and interests of aliens. 
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